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In 1995 and 1996, a paper and subsequent article entitled The Deepest of Ironies: Genetic Resources, Marine Scientific Research and the Area 1 raised for the first time the issue of fair and equitable utilisation of the genetic resources of the international seabed area (Area). The primary objective of the Deepest of Ironies was to raise awareness of the existence of the Area's genetic resources, and to catalyse debate on the marine scientific research and other activities involving them. It was suggested that the international community might wish to review whether there was a need for international measures to ensure fair and equitable utilisation of the Area's genetic resources.
The paper made four primary points. First, contrary to popular belief, the deep seabed was not a biological desert. Second, the negotiators of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) were unaware of the Area's genetic resources and had focused on its mineral resources. Third, the Area's genetic resources, and especially those from hydrothermal vents, were its most immediately exploitable and potentially lucrative natural resource. Fourth, a process was needed to clarify the legal and institutional issues surrounding the use of the Area's genetic resources.
The international community took note. These points are being discussed formally under the auspices of the UN General Assembly along with other high seas marine biodiversity issues. Much has been learned since the issue ---Second, and more importantly, the Deepest of Ironies proposed a review of activities involving the Area's genetic resources. It made four observations. First, government-or consortium-funded marine scientific research acwas introduced during a workshop on marine and coastal biodiversity preceding the first meeting of the Convention on Biological Diversity's (CBD) Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice (SBSTTA). With the international community's examination entering its 15th year, now is a good time to revisit the original proposal, highlight some important achievements, trends and lessons learned from other fora and offer some suggestions on how international consideration of the issue could be further refined in order to bring the process to a meaningful conclusion.
THE DEEPEST OF IRONIES: THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL
The Deepest of Ironies made the point that, despite the great time, effort and money invested during the 1960s and 1970s in exploring the mineral resources of the Area, and subsequently developing Part XI of the LOS Convention, it was the Area's genetic resources that were its most immediately exploitable and potentially lucrative natural resource. Yet they were not mentioned in the LOS Convention, the CBD did not apply to them and they were freely accessible under the high seas legal regime.
At the same time, few states had the technical, financial or human resources capacity to physically access and exploit these resources. The situation was therefore comparable to that which existed for the Area's mineral resources when the LOS Convention was being negotiated.
The Deepest of Ironies suggested an intergovernmental review of the situation following two lines of analysis. First, it proposed examining the desirability of maintaining the legal status of the Area's genetic resources within the high seas legal regime. In connection with determining whether a new legal status for the Area's genetic resources was necessary, it was suggested that the international community consider the means for doing this, including, for example, whether to extend the common heritage principle -clearly applicable only to the Area and its mineral resources -to the Area's genetic resources as well. It argued that if such a change in legal status was desirable, the means would need to be found to avoid: 1) hindering marine scientific research on the Area's biodiversity, 2) creating unreasonable obstacles to commercial biotechnological development, and 3) limiting unreasonably commercial incentives, such as intellectual property rights, for work undertaken on the Area's genetic resources. It also emphasised the need to avoid a negative backlash analogous to that which had occurred during the development of the Area's mining regime.
